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53,600 AI-swarm attacks. Every one stopped in the kernel. 0 bytes leaked.See the evidence

Industry · Technology

Protect what you build, and the agents that build it.

Your engineers ship with AI agents that hold production tokens. Solomon guards those tokens in the kernel, holds critical agent actions for a human signature, and investigates every alert across your cloud and code.

Problems and answers

Technology threats, mapped to Solomon.

Where software companies get hurt, and which part of the platform answers.

  • Coding agents with production access

    Engineers' coding and ops agents carry live tokens for repositories, clouds and clusters.

    Critical agent actions wait for a biometric, hardware-signed approval on the engineer's phone, and reads of secrets an agent was not scoped for are reported, or refused in the kernel where you enforce.

  • Leaked secrets and vulnerable dependencies

    A token pushed to a repository or a compromised package can open the door to production.

    OmniMesh ingests GitHub secret-scanning and Dependabot alerts and Snyk findings, and can revoke a leaked token once a person approves.

  • Kubernetes and cloud-native attack surface

    Ephemeral pods, cloud role credentials and container escapes change faster than manual rules.

    The Solomon eBPF Client runs on EKS and self-managed Kubernetes nodes, denies instance-metadata credential theft and stops container-escape steps inside the kernel.

  • Intellectual property walking out

    Source code and model weights are the company; exfiltration often looks like normal traffic.

    Each agent's network egress is limited to the destinations you allow, model weights and prompts are guarded at the file level, and data-loss findings are shown before an agent action is approved.

  • A security team that has to build, too

    You want security inside your own product and workflows, not one more console.

    Use Solomon as a platform: the multi-tenant Agentic AI Platform with SolomonPy and SolomonJS, and Solomon SOC's agents investigating every alert.

Emulated AI-agent swarm evidence run, 1 Oct 2026
swarm attempts on a live AWS EKS cluster, all stopped1
kernel containment2
native connectors in OmniMesh3
  1. 1Emulated AI-agent swarm evidence run, 1 Oct 2026: Live AWS EKS cluster · Intel + Graviton · 3 runs.
  2. 2Emulated AI-agent swarm evidence run, 1 Oct 2026: credential-file theft denied in 6–34 µs, process-secret dumps in 15–31 µs, attacker process tree killed in 31–130 µs, IMDS theft in 55–200 µs (medians).
  3. 3Connectors in the portal's integrations catalog today; the number updates as the catalog grows.

Your own agents

A person signs off on the risky ones.

Coding and ops agents are the newest insiders. Solomon XGuard puts their critical actions on the engineer’s phone for a biometric, hardware-signed approval bound to that one action.

On the host, the Solomon eBPF Client puts each agent in its own scope, so a prompt-injected agent reading your keys is reported at once, or refused in the kernel where you enforce.

Coding agent · approval requestillustration
agent
coding-agent · laptop of a.lee
action
kubectl delete deployment payments
cluster
prod-eks-1
risk
destructive
status
waiting for a.lee · biometric

Protect what you build.

Run Solomon on your own clusters in a guided pilot, or start building with the SDKs.