Microseconddefense againstAI swarm, credential theft, IMDS abuse, rogue agentattacks.
Solomon stops AI-agent swarms inside the kernel, investigates every alert with agentic AI and puts a human signature on every critical action.
Every syscall checked in the kernel.
- AWS
- EKS
- Graviton
- Ubuntu
- RHEL
- Amazon Linux
Measured, not marketed. Open numbers.
swarm attempts stopped inside the kernel
Measured · Oct 2026- kernel containment
- <µs
- of secrets leaked
- bytes
- agentic investigation
- <min
Measured · same swarm, with and without
Same swarm. Nothing leaves.
Without Solomon the swarm emptied the host of its secrets in 17 ms. With Solomon, across 53,600 attempts in four environments, not one byte got out.1
1 Emulated AI-agent swarm evidence run, 1 Oct 2026, and the recorded swarm demo on the same host, Oct 2026. Each bar is the share of a batch of attempts that got secrets out: 20 batches of 100 without, 20 batches of 2,680 with. Canary data only, no real credentials. Method and every number.
100 agents attack. 0 survive.
Attempts blocked
- swarm100 AI agents · 20 rounds · 3 attack vectorst+0
- denyIMDS 169.254.169.254 · connect4 -EPERM211 µs p50
- killread ~/.aws/credentials · SIGKILLrc=-9
- killscrape /proc/self/environ · SIGKILLrc=-9
- wave 110 agents · 600 / 600 blocked0 B
- wave 250 agents · 3,000 / 3,000 blocked0 B
- wave 3100 agents · 6,000 / 6,000 blocked0 B
- clientRSS 181.3 MB (+2.0 MB) · 48 containers upok
Replay of a recorded run, Oct 2026: 10, then 50, then 100 concurrent AI agents on an NVIDIA DGX workstation, 20 rounds, 3 attack vectors. The horizontal axis is the order of events in the kernel log, not wall-clock time.
Median time to stop
Stopped in the kernel. Before the read returns.
- Steal cloud credentials fileT1552.0016–34 µs
- Dump process secretsT155215–31 µs
- Kill the attacker's process treecontainment31–130 µs
- Steal cloud role credentials (IMDS)T1552.00555–200 µs
- AI- or analyst-ordered kill, platform → hostend to end4–18 ms
- Container escape killedT1611 · incl. process start13–56 ms
Medians. Source: Emulated AI-agent swarm evidence run, 1 Oct 2026. The end-to-end kill is an AI- or analyst-ordered kill travelling platform → host; container-escape timing includes process start.
The Solomon loop
Speed without trust is useless. Solomon delivers both.
- OktaIdentity
- Microsoft Entra IDIdentity
- CrowdStrike FalconEndpoint
- SentinelOneEndpoint
- AWS CloudTrailCloud
- AWS GuardDutyCloud
- WizCloud
- CloudflareNetwork
- native connectors
- 35
- deterministic YARA and Sigma rules
- 10,000+
- tap to approve a critical action
- 1
The comparison tabs describe what each category typically does out of the box. It is a generalisation, not a claim about any vendor’s product. Connector count from the portal’s integrations catalog today.
Every process tree. Its own wall.
Solomon contains each workload in the kernel, before lateral movement.
An agent that reaches for a secret or a namespace is killed where it stands.
Your own AI agents
Your agents hold real keys. XGuard holds the pen.
No human gate
Every critical action runs.
- coding01
- ops02
- team03!
- personal04
- coding05
- ops06!
- team07
- personal08
- coding09!
- ops10
- team11
- personal12!
- Live tokens
- 12 exposed
- Critical actions
- 4 running unchecked
- Who approved
- Nobody
Solomon XGuard
Every critical action waits for a person.
- coding01
- ops02
- team03paused
- personal04
- coding05
- ops06paused
- team07
- personal08
- coding09paused
- ops10
- team11
- personal12paused
- Live tokens
- Single-use grants
- Critical actions
- 4 paused, 0 decided
- Who approved
- A person, Face ID
Approval request · XGuard
agent-03 wants to run
kubectl delete deployment payments- Agent
- agent-03 · team
- Target
- prod-eks-1
- DLP scan
- No secrets in payload
- Risk
- High · Lateral escalation
Single-use grant · bound to this action, host and window
Measured evidence · 1 Oct 2026
Four environments. 100% stopped.
Emulated AI-agent swarm: 50–100 concurrent workers issuing real attacker system calls against canary data (no exploits, no real credentials) on Amazon Linux 2023, RHEL 9 and Ubuntu 20.04/22.04. Lab results from disposable AWS test hosts, a 2-node EKS cluster and an in-house production server. 6 of 8 kill-chain steps are blocked; shell spawn and covert tunnels are monitored. Read the full evidence and method.
AI economics
Every investigation. 92% cheaper.
VIntercept proprietary multi-model routing vs blind model calls, median of 100 tickets, answer quality held at 100%.
How Solomon compares.
| Solomon | Legacy EDR | SIEM + SOAR | AI SOC copilot | MDR service | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kernel-level containment | In the syscall | After an alert | Through your EDR | ||
| Time to contain | < 300 µsMeasured | After detection | Playbook run | Analyst decides | Analyst decides |
| Agentic investigation | < 8 min | Playbooks | By people | ||
| Deterministic rule gate on AI actions | 10,000+ rules | Rules, no AI gate | |||
| Human signature on critical actions | Hardware-signed | Approval step | Chat confirm | Analyst call | |
| Protects your own AI agents | XGuard | ||||
| Works agentless and with a sensor | Both | Sensor only | Agentless only | Agentless only | Varies |
| Yes With a condition No Best in row | |||||
Columns describe what each category typically offers out of the box, not any vendor’s product; individual products vary. Solomon figures are measured (see the evidence page).
Bring Solomon to your infrastructure.
- Step 1 of 3
- Step 2 of 3
- Step 3 of 3
Pilot · step 1 of 3
What do you want to protect first?
Pick one, or press 1 to 4.
What does VIntercept offer?
The Solomon platform: the Solomon eBPF Client (kernel-level EDR and CDR for Linux), the Solomon Agentic AI Platform (the multi-tenant backend), Solomon SOC (the agentic SOC), Solomon OmniMesh (connectors and remediation), Solomon XGuard (mobile approvals on iOS and Android) and the SolomonPy and SolomonJS SDKs. We also run services on top of it.
How is the eBPF Client different from a traditional EDR?
It decides on the system call itself, inside the Linux kernel. Credential theft is denied before the read completes and an attacker's process tree is killed in place. In our emulated AI-agent swarm evidence run, containment took < 300 µs.
Do I have to replace my SIEM or EDR?
No. OmniMesh connects the identity, EDR, cloud, SIEM and ticketing tools you already own (35 native connectors today), and the agents work on their data.
How do you stop AI agents from doing harm?
Every action an agent proposes first passes a deterministic layer of 10,000+ YARA and Sigma rules and the tenant's autonomy cap, which no alert can exceed. Destructive actions need human approval, and agent identities can propose actions but never approve them.
Where does the eBPF Client run?
On Linux hosts, containers and Kubernetes nodes, including EKS. It is tested on a 14-target kernel matrix on disposable EC2: Amazon Linux 2023 (incl. the EKS AMI) and 2, RHEL 9, Ubuntu 20.04, 22.04 and 24.04, on x86_64 and arm64.
Where do your numbers come from?
Each figure on this site names its source. The security numbers come from our emulated AI-agent swarm evidence run; the method and results are on the evidence page.
Can I try it on my own infrastructure?
Yes. Request a pilot and we will scope a guided pilot on your own workloads with you.
How is my data kept apart from other customers'?
Each tenant gets its own database, event streams, storage, vector memory and secrets. The tenant is taken only from a verified token claim, never from a header or request body.