Skip to content

53,600 AI-swarm attacks. Every one stopped in the kernel. 0 bytes leaked.See the evidence

Service · Incident response

Under attack? Reach us now.

Call or email the VIntercept team. We contain the attack inside the kernel with the Solomon eBPF Client, reconstruct what happened with Solomon SOC’s agents, and give you an evidence trail you can check.

Active incident? Contact us now

Tell us what you are seeing, which systems are affected and how to reach you. Please don’t send passwords or keys by email.

How we respond

Contain, investigate, eradicate, recover.

  1. 01

    Contain

    We deploy the Solomon eBPF Client on affected Linux hosts and Kubernetes nodes. It denies credential theft, kills the attacker's process tree and can isolate a host from the network, all in the kernel.

  2. 02

    Investigate

    Solomon SOC's agents pull telemetry from your connected tools and rebuild the timeline, recording the hypotheses they rejected and the evidence for each step.

  3. 03

    Eradicate

    Respond proposes the smallest actions that remove the attacker: revoke sessions and leaked keys, kill processes, quarantine instances. Each one shows its blast radius and rollback.

  4. 04

    Recover

    Detect turns what the incident taught into rules, backtested on your data, so the same technique is caught next time.

Containment

Stopped where it runs.

The eBPF Client decides on the system call itself. A process reading your cloud credentials or another process’s secrets is denied before the read completes, and the attacker’s process tree is killed.

Nothing destructive happens without a person: every eradication step the agents propose waits for your approval, and every decision is written to the audit log.

Incident timelineillustration
  1. 00:00clientsolomon-client installed on web-03 · policy: enforce
  2. 00:00kerneldeny read ~/.aws/credentials · pid 4242
  3. 00:00kernelkill process tree · pid 4242 → 3 children
  4. 00:04investigatehypothesis: stolen deploy key · querying CloudTrail
  5. 00:06investigaterejected: VPN login is the on-call engineer
  6. 00:07respondrevoke 2 IAM sessions · needs approval
Emulated AI-agent swarm evidence run, 1 Oct 2026
kernel containment1
to kill the attacker's process tree2
AI- or analyst-ordered kill, platform to host3
per agentic investigation4
  1. 1Emulated AI-agent swarm evidence run, 1 Oct 2026: credential-file theft denied in 6–34 µs, process-secret dumps in 15–31 µs, attacker process tree killed in 31–130 µs, IMDS theft in 55–200 µs (medians).
  2. 2Emulated AI-agent swarm evidence run, 1 Oct 2026: medians.
  3. 3Emulated AI-agent swarm evidence run, 1 Oct 2026: medians, end to end.
  4. 4Measured end-to-end Solomon SOC agentic investigations (owner-confirmed, 19 Oct 2026).

Prepare before the next incident.

Talk to us about a retainer, or run a guided pilot now so response starts from tools and telemetry that are already connected.