Service · Incident response
Under attack? Reach us now.
Call or email the VIntercept team. We contain the attack inside the kernel with the Solomon eBPF Client, reconstruct what happened with Solomon SOC’s agents, and give you an evidence trail you can check.
Active incident? Contact us now
Tell us what you are seeing, which systems are affected and how to reach you. Please don’t send passwords or keys by email.
How we respond
Contain, investigate, eradicate, recover.
- 01
Contain
We deploy the Solomon eBPF Client on affected Linux hosts and Kubernetes nodes. It denies credential theft, kills the attacker's process tree and can isolate a host from the network, all in the kernel.
- 02
Investigate
Solomon SOC's agents pull telemetry from your connected tools and rebuild the timeline, recording the hypotheses they rejected and the evidence for each step.
- 03
Eradicate
Respond proposes the smallest actions that remove the attacker: revoke sessions and leaked keys, kill processes, quarantine instances. Each one shows its blast radius and rollback.
- 04
Recover
Detect turns what the incident taught into rules, backtested on your data, so the same technique is caught next time.
Containment
Stopped where it runs.
The eBPF Client decides on the system call itself. A process reading your cloud credentials or another process’s secrets is denied before the read completes, and the attacker’s process tree is killed.
Nothing destructive happens without a person: every eradication step the agents propose waits for your approval, and every decision is written to the audit log.
- 00:00clientsolomon-client installed on web-03 · policy: enforce
- 00:00kerneldeny read ~/.aws/credentials · pid 4242
- 00:00kernelkill process tree · pid 4242 → 3 children
- 00:04investigatehypothesis: stolen deploy key · querying CloudTrail
- 00:06investigaterejected: VPN login is the on-call engineer
- 00:07respondrevoke 2 IAM sessions · needs approval
- kernel containment1
- to kill the attacker's process tree2
- AI- or analyst-ordered kill, platform to host3
- per agentic investigation4
- 1Emulated AI-agent swarm evidence run, 1 Oct 2026: credential-file theft denied in 6–34 µs, process-secret dumps in 15–31 µs, attacker process tree killed in 31–130 µs, IMDS theft in 55–200 µs (medians).
- 2Emulated AI-agent swarm evidence run, 1 Oct 2026: medians.
- 3Emulated AI-agent swarm evidence run, 1 Oct 2026: medians, end to end.
- 4Measured end-to-end Solomon SOC agentic investigations (owner-confirmed, 19 Oct 2026).
Solomon platform
What we respond with
- Kernel actsSolomon eBPF ClientKernel-level containment on Linux hosts, containers and Kubernetes nodes.Explore
- Agentic investigationSolomon SOCInvestigate rebuilds the attack; Respond proposes the fix, with rollback.Explore
- Correlate and remediateSolomon OmniMeshPulls evidence from your identity, EDR and cloud tools and carries out approved actions.Explore
- AI agents thinkSolomon Agentic AI PlatformChecks every proposed action against deterministic rules before anyone approves.Explore
Prepare before the next incident.
Talk to us about a retainer, or run a guided pilot now so response starts from tools and telemetry that are already connected.